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efects. In the typical stimulus for launching, a stationary 
object (the target) is visible near the centre of the screen. A 
moving object (the launcher) enters from the side, moving 
horizontally on a path that takes it to contact with the tar-
get. When the launcher contacts the target, the target stops 
moving and the launcher starts moving in the same direc-
tion and with the same or slightly lesser speed. Observers 
consistently report an impression that the launcher made 
the target move by bumping into it (Hubbard 2013a, b; 
Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000). The typical 
stimulus for entraining is similar except that the object per-
ceived as causal in this case, called the entrainer, contin-
ues to move after contacting the target, and the two objects 
remain in contact. Observers consistently report an impres-
sion that the entrainer pushes or carries the target (Hubbard 
2013a, b; Michotte 1963; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000).
Michotte (1963) proposed explanations for these causal 
impressions that owed much to principles of perceptual 
grouping in Gestalt psychology. In particular, in the case 
of entraining, Michotte proposed that the impression was 
mediated by the principle of common fate. Common fate 
is perceptual grouping of objects by possession of similar 
motion properties (see Wagemans et al. 2012, for a recent 
review). For example, a number of spatially separated geo-
metrical objects moving in a uniform way across a ield 
will tend to pop out of a background as a result of group-
ing by common fate (Wertheimer 1923). Thus, the com-
mon motion properties of entrainer and target after contact 
counted as an example of common fate, integrating the two 
objects in a perceptual group, resulting in a uniied percept 
in which the common motion of the two objects is that of 
the entrainer (Michotte 1963).
Michotte’s interpretation of entraining is not universally 
accepted and several other hypotheses have been proposed 
(Hubbard 2013a, b; Scholl and Tremoulet 2000; White (in 
Abstract Many studies of perceptual impressions of cau-
sality have used a stimulus in which a moving object (the 
launcher) contacts a stationary object (the target) and the 
latter then moves of. Such stimuli give rise to an impres-
sion that the launcher makes the target move. In the present 
experiments, instead of a single target object, an array of 
four vertically aligned objects was used. The launcher con-
tacted none of them, but stopped at a point between the two 
central objects. The four objects then moved with similar 
motion properties, exhibiting the Gestalt property of com-
mon fate. Strong impressions of causality were reported for 
this stimulus. It is argued that the array of four objects was 
perceived, by the likelihood principle, as a single object 
with some parts unseen, that the launcher was perceived as 
contacting one of the unseen parts of this object, and that 
the causal impression resulted from that. Supporting that 
argument, stimuli in which kinematic features were manip-
ulated so as to weaken or eliminate common fate yielded 
weaker impressions of causality.
Introduction
It is well established that certain conigurations of mov-
ing objects give rise to perceptual impressions of causal-
ity (Hubbard 2013a, b; Michotte 1963; Scholl and Trem-
oulet 2000). The two best known examples of perceptual 
impressions of causality, also known as “phenomenal cau-
sality” (Michotte 1963), are the launching and entraining 
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press)). In this paper, however, I argue that common fate 
has a diferent kind of relevance to both the launching and 
entraining efects. Several studies have shown that the 
launching efect is absent or greatly weakened if there is a 
gap between the two objects; that is, if the launcher stops 
moving before it contacts the target (Michotte 1963; Yela 
1952; Young and Falmier 2008). I test the hypothesis that a 
stronger causal impression can be obtained for both launch-
ing and entraining stimuli if the launcher or entrainer stops 
at a location perceptually interpreted as part of a perceptual 
object created by perceptual grouping of visible objects 
according to common fate.
The basic stimulus for launching in this study is shown 
in Fig. 1. The irst part of this igure shows the irst frame 
of the stimulus, with four objects in a vertical arrangement 
with gaps between them. These are the target objects and 
they are initially stationary. The launcher is visible at the 
left side of the frame. The launcher moves horizontally 
across the frame at a constant speed. The second part of 
Fig. 1 shows the location at which the launcher stops mov-
ing. It has not contacted any of the four target objects, but 
it has stopped at a point that would be considered as con-
tacting an object if there was in fact a single object with 
the breadth of the target objects extending down the screen 
from the highest target to the lowest. At that moment, the 
four target objects start moving horizontally to the right at 
constant speed. The third part of Fig. 1 shows a later stage 
in this motion, which continues until the objects exit the 
screen.
It is hypothesized that the initial location and subsequent 
motion of the four target objects, conforming to the com-
mon fate principle, perceptually establishes them as the vis-
ible parts of a single object extending vertically across the 
space the objects delimit. This is essentially an application 
of the likelihood principle, irst formulated by Helmholtz 
(Wagemans et al. 2012). This principle states that “the per-
ceptual system determines the most likely distal stimulus 
that could have given rise to the proximal stimulus (the 
retinal image)” (Wagemans et  al. 2012, p. 1225). Thus, it 
is extremely unlikely that four separate objects would share 
precisely the same motion properties, including both onset 
time and velocity, but rather less unlikely that they are in 
fact the visible parts of a single object. The object might, 
for example, be partly occluded by foreground objects.
Under that interpretation, the launcher does not stop at a 
distance from the target objects, but is perceived as directly 
contacting the unseen boundary of an object of which the 
targets are the visible parts. Therefore, a relatively strong 
impression of launching should occur with this stimulus. 
The word “relatively” is used with the implication of suita-
ble control stimuli, which will be described later. In Exper-
iment 1, an entraining version of this stimulus was used as 
well. This is depicted schematically in Fig. 2. As the igure 
shows, the stimulus is similar to the launching stimulus 
except that the entrainer continues moving with the same 
motion properties as the target objects. A relatively strong 
impression of entraining should occur with this stimulus.
In the stimuli depicted in Figs.  1 and 2, the launcher/
entrainer is a single object and the target comprises mul-
tiple objects. This can of course be reversed so that the 
launcher/entrainer comprises multiple objects and the tar-
get is a single object. Since the motion of the launcher/
entrainer establishes common fate for the four objects, the 
Fig. 1  Schematic representation of the launching version of the com-
mon fate stimulus with a single object as launcher. A shows the irst 
frame of the stimulus. The four white squares near the centre of the 
frame are the target and the black disc is the launcher. The launcher 
moves horizontally to the right. B shows the frame in which the 
launcher stops moving. Without delay, the target objects start mov-
ing horizontally to the right. C shows a frame from that phase of the 
stimulus. Eventually the target objects exit the frame at the right-hand 
side
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causal impression should be just as strong for this kind of 
stimulus as for the Figs. 1 and 2 stimuli. These versions of 
the stimulus are depicted in Fig. 3 (launching) and Fig. 4 
(entraining).
The basic hypothesis is that the strength of the causal 
impression should be afected by factors that afect the 
occurrence and strength of perceptual grouping by com-
mon fate. Two experiments are reported that test the pre-
dicted efects of such manipulations. For ease of reference, 
the independent variables in the two experiments are listed 
in Table 1.
Experiment 1
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to test the hypothesis 
that stronger causal impressions would occur for stimuli 
where perceptual grouping of the targets by common 
fate is strong than for stimuli where it is weak or absent. 
Some conditions afecting perceptual grouping by com-
mon fate have been elucidated in studies by Uttal, Spill-
mann, Stürzel, and Sekuler (2000) and Stürzel and Spill-
mann (2004). In those studies, observers were required 
to detect common fate shared by objects in a context of 
other objects with diferent motion properties. No such 
context is used in the present research, but it is still pre-
dicted that the strength of the causal impression should 
Fig. 2  Schematic representation of the entraining version of the com-
mon fate stimulus with a single object as entrainer. Figure 1A shows 
the irst frame of the stimulus. The four white squares near the cen-
tre of the frame are the target and the black disc is the entrainer. The 
stimulus is identical to the launching stimulus shown in Fig. 1, except 
that, when the black disc reaches the point where the launcher stops, 
it continues moving at the same speed as the targets: this is depicted 
in Fig. 1C
Fig. 3  Schematic representation of the launching version of the 
common fate stimulus with multiple objects as launcher. The motion 
properties are exactly as in the Fig.  1 stimulus, but the roles of the 
four white squares and the black disc are reversed, as shown
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vary in a manner predictable from the indings of the 
detection studies.
Where there is only one target object there is no com-
mon fate, so a stimulus presenting just one of the target 
objects shown in Figs.  1 and 2 should generate a weaker 
causal impression than that generated by the Figs. 1 and 2 
stimuli. Where there are two target objects, common fate 
can occur if they share motion properties. Likelihood of 
detection of the target stimulus increases as the number of 
objects increases up to about four (Stürzel and Spillmann 
2004; Uttal et al. 2000). This implies that perceptual group-
ing by common fate is weaker with two objects than with 
four. This therefore predicts that versions of the Figs.  1 
and 2 stimuli with just two of the four target objects visible 
should yield weaker causal impressions than the Figs. 1 and 
2 stimuli, but the causal impressions should still be stronger 
than for the stimuli with just one visible target object.
Uttal et  al. (2000) and Stürzel and Spillmann (2004) 
also found an approximately linear relation between spac-
ing of the objects and likelihood of detection, with greater 
likelihood of detection at close spacing. This generates the 
prediction that the causal impression should be stronger if 
the target objects are closely spaced than if they are spaced 
further apart.
Finally, the target in Figs.  1, 2, 3 and 4 is stationary 
until the launcher or entrainer stops moving. This means 
that perceptual grouping by common fate is not estab-
lished until after the causal object has stopped moving. In 
Experiment 1, each stimulus was compared with one in 
which the target was initially positioned at the right side of 
the frame and moved towards the centre. The motion was 
timed so that the target reached the position shown in panel 
B of each of the four igures at the same moment that the 
launcher/entrainer reached the position shown in panel B of 
each igure. At that moment, the target reversed direction 
and moved as in the four igures after contact. Thus, every-
thing was the same except for the prior motion of the target. 
In the prior motion stimuli, perceptual grouping by com-
mon fate is established before the launcher or entrainer has 
stopped moving. It was predicted that this would result in 
a stronger causal impression for this prior motion stimulus 
than for the stimuli in Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4. There is, however, 
an alternative basis for predicting a stronger causal impres-
sion for the prior motion stimulus than for the stimuli in 
Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4. In a real collision event, it takes more 
force to reverse the direction of motion of an object that 
is already moving than it does to set it in motion from a 
stationary position. Therefore, it is possible that the causal 
object is perceived as exerting more force on the target with 
prior motion than without, and that this would lead to a 
stronger causal impression.
The reasoning about common fate applies to the causal 
object as well as to the target. With the stimuli shown 
in Figs.  3 and 4, a causal impression should still occur 
because the target is perceived as being struck by a non-
visible part of a single object of which the four objects are 
the visible parts. Exactly the same predictions hold, there-
fore, for the manipulations of number of visible objects and 
spatial separation. The prediction for efect of prior motion 
is diferent, however. Because the causal object is in motion 
from the start of the stimulus, perceptual grouping by com-
mon fate has already occurred before contact with the tar-
get. Therefore, manipulating the prior motion of the target 
should make no diference to the strength of the causal 
impression, insofar as that is afected by common fate. That 
prediction is speciic to the case where the common fate 
object is the causal object, and difers from the prediction, 
Fig. 4  Schematic representation of the entraining version of the 
common fate stimulus with multiple objects as launcher. The motion 
properties are exactly as in the Fig.  2 stimulus, but the roles of the 
four white squares and the black disc are reversed, as shown
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given above, for the case where the common fate object 
is the target, the case depicted in Fig.  1. However, if the 
causal object is perceived as exerting more force on the tar-
get in the prior motion stimulus than in the stimulus where 
the target is stationary prior to contact, there should still be 
a signiicant efect of the prior motion manipulation on the 
strength of the causal impression.
Method
Participants
The participants were 120 volunteer irst-year undergradu-
ate students with normal or corrected to normal vision, 
participating in return for course credit. There were 30 
participants in each of the four between-subject condi-
tions described below, and assignment to conditions was 
random. A target sample size of 120 was set before data 
collection started, and data collection continued until the 
target was met. No participants were excluded from data 
analysis. Informed consent was obtained from all individ-
ual participants included in the study.
Apparatus and stimulus materials
Stimuli consisted of frame sequences generated by a Mac-
intosh G3 computer and displayed on a Mitsubishi Dia-
mond Plus 71 16″ CRT colour monitor. The frames were 
presented in phase with the computer’s vertical blank sig-
nal and therefore appeared at the refresh rate of 74  Hz. 
Each frame was 500 pixels (18.5  cm) wide by 300 pixels 
(11.1 cm) high. The boundaries of this frame appeared on 
the screen as thin black lines (to provide a rationale for the 
appearance and disappearance of the objects as they entered 
and exited the frame). These disappeared between trials, 
leaving the screen uniform white. All sequences consisted 
of 200 frames, lasting 2.7 s. The background of each frame 
was uniform white throughout. Stimuli were variations on 
those depicted in Figs.  1, 2, 3 and 4. Object boundaries 
were clearly deined and object motion appeared smooth to 
the eye.
Features common to all stimuli included speed of 
the causal object (18.9  cm/s) and speed of the target 
(13.5  cm/s). These speeds and speed ratio were chosen 
because they are in the range of values that maximises the 
strength and likelihood of occurrence of the launching and 
entraining efects (Michotte 1963; Natsoulas 1961). The 
causal objects were 1.75  cm in diameter and the target 
objects were 1.05 × 1.05 cm squares.
Design
There were ive independent variables, two between-sub-
jects and three within-subjects.
Kind of phenomenal causality (launching versus entrain-
ing) was a between-subject manipulation. The object with 
common fate could be either the target object, as in Figs. 1 
Table 1  Summary of the manipulations in the two experiments
Experiment 1 
Kind of phenomenal causality (launching v. entraining); between-subjects. 
Object with common fate (causal object v. target object); between-subjects. 
Number and location of common fate objects (1 v. 2 v. 4); within-subjects. 
 Two different locations were used for both 1 object and 2 objects. 
Prior motion of target object (stationary v. right-to-left motion); within-subjects. 
Spatial separation of common fate objects (wide v. narrow); within-subjects. 
Experiment 2 
A standard stimulus comprising a launching stimulus with one causal object and four target objects as shown in 
Figure 1 was compared with stimuli in each of three sets. 
Vertical offset set. Initial positions of common fate objects were offset with two variables: 
 1. Total amount of displacement (1.05 v. 2.10 v. 3.15 cm). 
 2. Order of displacement (two different orders). 
Motion onset delay set. Motion onset delayed by varying amounts, with three variables: 
 1. Delay of first object to move (0 v. 54 ms). 
 2. Interval between first and last object starting to move (162 v. 324 v. 486 ms). 
 3. Order of displacement (same as in vertical offset set). 
Speed variation set. Target objects moved at different speeds, with three variables. 
 1. Difference in amount of variation between objects (8.1 v. 16.2 cm/s). 
 2. Speed of slowest object (2.7 v. 8.1 cm/s). 
 3. Order of displacement (same as in vertical offset set). 
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and 2, or the causal object, as in Figs. 3 and 4, and this too 
was a between-subject manipulation.
The number and location of common fate objects was a 
within-subjects variable with ive levels. There were either 
one, two, or four objects. However, for both one object and 
two objects, there was an additional manipulation of the 
location of these objects. Take the Fig. 1 stimulus and num-
ber the objects 1 to 4 from top to bottom. For the two-
object stimuli, the two locations used were either numbers 
2 and 3 or numbers 3 and 4. For the one-object stimuli, the 
two locations used were either number 3 or number 4.1
Prior motion of the target object was manipulated 
within-subjects with the target either being stationary (as 
in Figs. 1, 2, 3, 4) or moving from right to left. In the lat-
ter case, the target was initially positioned at the right edge 
of the frame and moved horizontally towards the x-coordi-
nate of the target shown in panel B of Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4. 
Its arrival at that location coincided with the arrival of the 
causal object at the location shown in panel B of Figs. 1, 2, 
3 and 4.
Spatial separation of the common fate objects was 
manipulated within-subjects. Distances between the cen-
tres of the objects were either 50 pixels between objects 1 
and 2 and between objects 3 and 4 and 100 pixels between 
objects 2 and 3 (narrow), or 80 pixels between objects 1 
and 2 and between objects 3 and 4 and 100 pixels between 
objects 2 and 3 (wide).
1 The locations of the two-object and one-object stimuli were origi-
nally chosen to test another aspect of the common fate hypothesis. 
For the two-object stimuli, the objects in locations 2 and 3 are either 
side of the plane of motion of the other object (the launcher in the 
Fig.  1 stimulus). This is necessary to control symmetricality of the 
arrangement in the comparison with the four-object stimulus. The 
objects in locations 3 and 4 are both below the plane of motion of 
the other object. In this case, it might seem as though the common 
fate object does not extend as far up as the plane of motion of the 
other object, and a correspondingly weaker causal impression might 
be expected. On the other hand, the fact that these two objects both 
start to move with shared motion properties at the moment the other 
objects stops might be suicient, as an unusual coincidence, to 
prompt a phenomenal extension of the common fate object up at least 
as far as the plane of the other object’s motion, so that the impression 
would be that the other object struck that phenomenal extension and 
thereby set the two visible parts of the common fate object in motion. 
The lack of signiicant diference between the rated causal impression 
for the two two-object stimuli is consistent with the latter possibility 
and not with the former, but is not conclusive. The inding that the 
mean rating for the one object at location 4 was signiicantly lower 
than that for all other conditions, including the one object at location 
3, makes interpretation of the results more problematic, because it 
suggests a simple efect of gap size (the object in location 4 is further 
from the stopping point of the causal object than the object in loca-
tion 3 is), and that makes it possible that the result for the two-object 
stimuli is confounded by an efect of gap size as well. The issue of the 
comparisons between these stimuli and their possible interpretations 
is demoted from the main text for the sake of clarity.
The manipulations are summarised in Table  1. They 
yielded a total of 20 stimuli (5 × 2 × 2) per participant.
Procedure
The experiment was run in a small laboratory, empty except 
for the equipment used for the experiment and with luores-
cent lighting giving a low ambient light level. Participants 
were seated so that their faces were approximately 75 cm. 
from the screen and were permitted to adjust this distance 
slightly for personal comfort. The experimenter introduced 
the experiment by giving the participant written instruc-
tions. Those for the condition with launching stimuli and 
the object with common fate being the target object were 
as follows:
“In this experiment you will see a series of short 
movies. In each of these movies you will see between 
one and four white squares that are either stationary 
near the centre of the screen or moving from right to 
left. You will also see a black disc enter from the left 
and move towards the centre. At some point it will 
stop and the squares will move from left to right.
“Your task is to answer a question concerning the 
visual impression you had about what made the white 
square(s) move. The question is:
Do you have the impression that the black disc some-
how made the white square(s) move?
“Note, irst, that this question is asking about how-
ever many white squares were visible. For example, 
if four squares were visible, the question is asking 
whether you had the impression that the black disc 
made all four of them move. Note also that the ques-
tion concerns the motion of the white squares from 
left to right, when and after the black disc stops mov-
ing, and does not concern any movement that might 
have occurred before that point. If these instructions 
are not clear, please ask me and I will explain further.
“The question you are asked might sound odd when 
the black disc and the white square(s) do not come 
into contact, but people often do have a visual impres-
sion that one object made one or more others move 
even under conditions where this could not happen 
in real life. Sometimes, for example, they report see-
ing the gap between the objects as a kind of medium 
through which inluence is transmitted from one 
object to another. That is what this experiment is con-
cerned with: the visual impression you have, in other 
words to what extent you see the black disc make the 
white square(s) move, despite what you think could 
be possible.”
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“You should answer each question by giving me a 
number from 0 to 100, where 0 means that you had 
no visual impression that the black disc made the 
white square(s) move at all, and 100 means that you 
had a very strong visual impression that the black 
disc made the white square(s) move. You may choose 
any number between 0 and 100; the more you had the 
visual impression that the black disc made the white 
square(s) move, the higher the number you should 
put, up to a maximum of 100. For each movie, please 
write down your rating in the appropriate place on the 
rating sheet.
“When you’ve inished reading this, I will give you 
further instructions on how to go through the mov-
ies.”
The written instructions for the other conditions were 
identical except for changes in the descriptions of the 
objects in accordance with diferences in the stimuli. For 
example, where the above instructions say that the par-
ticipants will see between one and four squares either sta-
tionary near the centre of the screen or moving from right 
to left, in conditions where the target object was a single 
object, this was changed to saying that the participants 
would see one black disc. Equivalent changes were made 
elsewhere in the instructions, where appropriate.
There were no practice trials. When the participants 
indicated that they understood the instructions, they were 
shown how to proceed through the stimuli by moving the 
cursor to a box saying “show next movie” and clicking on 
it. The experimenter monitored the participants as they ran 
through this procedure.
Stimuli were randomly ordered and a diferent random 
order was generated for each participant. At the end of the 
session, participants were thanked and given course credit 
and a debrieing sheet, which informed them about the 
research topic but did not mention the speciic hypotheses 
being tested.
All procedures performed in this study were in accord-
ance with the ethical standards of the author’s institution 
and were approved by the institution’s Ethics Committee, 
and with the 1964 Helsinki declaration and its later amend-
ments or comparable ethical standards.
Results
Data were initially analysed with a 2 between (kind 
of phenomenal causality, launching v. entraining)  ×  2 
between (common fate object, causal object v. target) × 2 
within (target prior motion, stationary v. right-to-left) × 5 
within (number and location of common fate objects, 4 
v. 2 at positions 2 and 3—hereafter 2/2&3—v. 2/3&4 v. 
1/3 v. 1/4) × 2 within (spatial separation of common fate 
objects, narrow v. wide) mixed design analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA). Efect sizes for signiicant efects were 
computed using partial eta squared (Fritz et al. 2012).
There was no signiicant main efect of kind of phe-
nomenal causality, F (1, 116) = 0.02, MSE = 9133.10, 
p > 0.05. The only signiicant efect involving this factor 
was an interaction with target prior motion which will 
be described shortly. There was no signiicant efect of 
common fate object, F (1, 116) = 0.74, MSE = 9133.10, 
p > 0.05. There was just one signiicant efect involving 
this factor, a three-way interaction with number and loca-
tion of targets and spatial separation, which also will be 
described shortly.
There was a signiicant efect of number and location of 
common fate objects, F (4, 464) = 57.66, MSE = 424.50, 
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.33. Post hoc paired comparisons with the 
Tukey’s test revealed that the mean for four objects (73.18) 
was signiicantly higher than all of the others. In addition, 
the mean for one object at location 4 (57.12) was signii-
cantly lower than all others. The mean for two objects in 
locations 2 and 3 (69.96) was signiicantly higher than 
those for one object at location 3 (65.74) and one object 
at location 4 (57.12), but was not signiicantly higher than 
that for two objects in locations 3 and 4 (67.04). The result 
for four objects supports the prediction, and the tendency 
for means for stimuli with two objects to be higher than 
means for stimuli with one object also does so. This main 
efect was qualiied by two signiicant interactions. Neither 
showed any trends that violated the efects just described; 
they will be described further shortly.
There was a signiicant efect of spatial separation, F (1, 
116) = 35.11, MSE = 405.72, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.23, with a 
higher mean at narrow separation (69.04) than at wide sep-
aration (64.17). This supports the prediction.
There was a signiicant efect of target prior motion, 
F (1, 116) = 91.29, MSE = 556.59, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.44 
with a higher mean with right to left prior motion (71.21) 
than with the objects stationary (62.01). This supports the 
prediction.
There was, as mentioned earlier, a signiicant interac-
tion between target prior motion and kind of phenomenal 
causality, F (1, 116) = 14.58, MSE = 556.59, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.11. Simple efects analysis revealed no signiicant 
efect of kind of phenomenal causality. The efect of target 
prior motion, however, appeared to be stronger with launch-
ing stimuli, F (1, 116) = 89.42, MSE = 556.59, p < 0.001, 
η2p = 0.44, than with entraining stimuli, F (1, 116) = 16.45, 
MSE = 556.59, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.12. In both cases, the dif-
ference was in the same direction as the main efect. This 
did not interact signiicantly with the common fate object 
factor, which means that it made no signiicant diference 
whether the target was one object or multiple objects, so 
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this result does not seem to bear on the hypotheses about 
common fate.
There was also a signiicant interaction between tar-
get prior motion and number and location of common 
fate objects, F (4, 464) = 3.95, MSE = 127.30, p < 0.01, 
η2p = 0.03. Simple efects analyses revealed that all com-
parisons were statistically signiicant in the direction of 
the respective main efects. It seems that the efect of 
number and location of common fate objects was stronger 
when the target was initially stationary, F (4, 464) = 52.02, 
MSE = 226.37, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.31, than when the tar-
get initially moved from right to left, F (4, 464) = 30.31, 
MSE = 203.31, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.21, but both efects were 
strongly signiicant. It is possible that establishment of 
common fate by launching or entraining is stronger than 
establishment of common fate by prior motion, but the 
trends in respect of the hypotheses were similar under both 
conditions.
There was just one other signiicant efect, the aforemen-
tioned three-way interaction between common fate object, 
number and location of common fate objects, and spatial 
separation, F (4, 464) = 3.55, MSE = 168.15, p < 0.01. 
η2p = 0.03. Means conformed to the directions of the main 
efects. However, for the condition with two common fate 
objects in positions 2 and 3, there was a strong efect of 
spatial separation when the common fate objects were the 
targets but no signiicant efect when the common fate 
objects were the causal objects. This does not seem to have 
any implications for the hypotheses.
Discussion
The main hypotheses about common fate were supported. 
Reported impressions of both launching and entraining 
were stronger when the common fate objects were four 
objects than when they were fewer, and also stronger when 
they were two than when there was just one. This tendency 
was not signiicantly afected by whether a launching or an 
entraining stimulus was used, nor by whether the common 
fate objects were the causal object or the target. In addi-
tion, as predicted on the basis of indings reported by Uttal 
et al. (2000) and Stürzel and Spillmann (2004), the causal 
impression was stronger when the spatial separation of the 
common fate objects was narrow than when it was wide, 
except for the condition with two common fate objects as 
causal objects in positions 2 and 3, where there was no sta-
tistically signiicant efect. Also as predicted, the causal 
impression was stronger when the target initially moved 
from right to left than when it was stationary. However, 
whether the target or the causal object was the common 
fate object made no signiicant diference to this tendency. 
It is therefore likely that it relects a diference in perceived 
force and not an efect of common fate.
Although the manipulation of number and location of 
common fate objects did not interact signiicantly with 
whether the stimulus was launching or entraining, this 
should not be taken as indicating that there are no difer-
ences in the factors that afect the occurrence and strength 
of the launching and entraining impressions. The efect of 
target prior motion was stronger with launching than with 
entraining stimuli, though signiicant with both. It is not 
clear how this should be interpreted. The critical difer-
ence between launching and entraining is that launching is 
a momentary event where the causal relation is conined to 
the time of contact between the objects, whereas in entrain-
ing, the causal object is perceived as acting on the target 
object for an extended period of time because of the tempo-
rally extended contact between them. Possibly prior motion 
of the target object is perceived as inluential at time of 
contact but not after that. This would entail a reduced efect 
of target prior motion with entraining stimuli because the 
action of the causal object on the target object is not per-
ceived as inluenced by the target’s prior motion after the 
initial contact between them has occurred. Further inves-
tigation of this could shed more light on the diferences 
between the launching and entraining impressions, which 
have hitherto been the subject of hardly any direct compari-
sons (Hubbard 2013a, b, c; Michotte 1963).
The reported causal impressions were stronger when 
there were four objects than when there were two. One pos-
sible explanation of this is that there could be diferences 
in the implied mass of the common fate object: the com-
mon fate object might be perceived as more massive when 
it encompassed four visible objects than when it encom-
passed two, because of the greater amount of space it occu-
pied. Size is not necessarily a valid guide to mass: a balloon 
is lighter than a golf ball, for example. It is possible that 
size is a visual cue to mass in the absence of other informa-
tion (Kotovsky and Baillargeon 1998). That would, how-
ever imply a prediction that the causal impressions should 
be stronger when the spatial separation of the objects was 
wider than when it was narrow, because wide separation 
creates a larger perceptual object than narrow separation 
does. That prediction is disconirmed by the present results 
that show a signiicant diference in the opposite direction. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that diferences in perceived mass 
account for the efect of four versus two objects.
Experiment 2
Common fate is determined by kinematic properties: 
objects that share common motion properties (e.g. velocity, 
time of onset) tend to be grouped together. This proposition 
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yields two hypotheses that were tested in Experiment 2. 
One is that common fate does not occur for objects that 
difer in their motion properties, so the causal impression 
should be weaker for stimuli in which the objects have 
diferent motion properties than for stimuli in which the 
objects have the same motion properties. The other is that 
the spatial relations between the objects do not contribute 
to common fate: the objects can be arranged in any way, so 
long as they share the same motion properties. In Experi-
ment 1, the objects were vertically aligned and moved 
horizontally. In Experiment 2 the vertical alignment is dis-
rupted to varying degrees, and it is predicted that this will 
not signiicantly afect the causal impression. There is an 
important qualiication to this. Note irst that the stimuli 
used in Experiment 2 were launching stimuli with a sin-
gle causal object and four target objects, and the argument 
is expressed with reference to that kind of stimulus. The 
qualiication is that the causal object should stop adjacent 
to a contour of the perceived object (i.e. the object that 
encompasses all of the target objects); more precisely, that 
this should be controlled across the manipulation of the 
spatial array. If this is not the case, then the causal impres-
sion may be weakened by a factor not connected to com-
mon fate, namely the presence of a spatial gap between the 
stopping point of the causal object and the boundary of the 
perceived target object (Michotte 1963; Yela 1952). Stimuli 
for Experiment 2 were devised with this qualiication in 
mind.
Method
Details of method were as for Experiment 1 with the fol-
lowing diferences. There were 30 participants, none of 
whom had participated in Experiment 1. Stimuli consisted 
of three sets of manipulations and one “standard” stimulus 
used for hypothesis testing purposes. There were 27 stim-
uli in all, comprising the standard stimulus, 6 in set 1, 12 
in set 2, and 8 in set 3. All stimuli were presented to each 
participant, and order of presentation was randomised inde-
pendently for each participant. The manipulations are sum-
marised in Table 1 and will now be described in detail.
Standard stimulus
The standard stimulus was a launching stimulus resem-
bling that depicted in Fig.  1, with a single causal object 
and four target objects. The critical features of the stand-
ard stimulus were that the four target objects in their ini-
tial locations were vertically aligned, that they all started to 
move at the same moment, and that they all moved with the 
same speed. These features were manipulated in three sets 
of stimuli described below. The experiment was designed, 
in part, to test whether the causal impression was weaker 
under the experimental manipulations described below 
than with this standard stimulus. Thus, statistical analyses 
included comparisons between the standard stimulus and 
individual stimuli in each set.
Vertical ofset set
The stimuli in this set were the same as the standard stim-
ulus, except that the initial positions of the target objects 
were horizontally ofset by varying amounts. In each 
stimulus, one object was not ofset, so as to maximise the 
proximity of the perceived object boundary to the point 
at which the causal object stopped moving. Successive 
objects were then displaced by equal amounts. Three difer-
ent total amounts of displacement were used, namely 1.05, 
2.10, and 3.15  cm. The order in which objects were dis-
placed was manipulated. One order, from zero to maximum 
displacement, was object 2, 4, 1, and 3, and the other was 
the opposite of that. These manipulations created a total of 
6 stimuli. All other features of the stimuli were as in the 
standard stimulus. Since the objects share the same motion 
properties throughout the stimulus, they possess common 
fate despite the ofset initial locations, so it is predicted that 
there will be no signiicant efect of the spatial displace-
ment manipulation.
Motion onset delay set
The stimuli in this set were the same as the standard stimu-
lus, except that delays in motion onset of individual target 
objects were introduced, with two independent variables. 
Delay before the irst object started moving was either zero 
or 54  ms. Delay between onset of motion in the irst and 
last target objects to move was either 162, 324, or 486 ms. 
The order in which the objects started to move was manipu-
lated with the same two orders as for the spatial displace-
ment manipulation in the vertical ofset set. These manipu-
lations created a total of 12 stimuli. All other features of the 
stimuli were as in the standard stimulus. Having the objects 
start to move at diferent times should rule out common 
fate, although this could be mitigated by the fact that they 
all end up with common motion properties. It is predicted 
that the delay manipulations will signiicantly weaken 
the causal impression by comparison with the standard 
stimulus.
Speed variation set
The stimuli in this set were the same as the standard stimu-
lus, except that the target objects moved at diferent speeds. 
Two amounts of variation in speed were used, one with a 
diference of 8.1 cm/s between the slowest object and the 
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fastest, and one with a diference of 16.2 cm/s. Two speeds 
of the slowest object were used, 2.7 and 8.1  cm/s. The 
order of objects with diferent speeds from slowest to fast-
est was manipulated with the same two orders as for the 
spatial displacement manipulation in the vertical ofset set. 
These manipulations created a total of 8 stimuli. All other 
features of the stimuli were as in the standard stimulus. 
Motion at diferent speeds means that there is no common 
fate, so it is predicted that both speed manipulations will 
signiicantly weaken the causal impression by comparison 
with the standard stimulus.
Results
Vertical ofset set
For purposes of comparison with the standard stimulus, 
data were initially analysed with a one-way ANOVA with 
7 levels, comprising the standard stimulus and the 6 ver-
tical ofset stimuli. The result was not signiicant, F (6, 
174) = 1.73, MSE = 142.39, p > 0.05. A planned two-way 
ANOVA was also carried out on the six vertical ofset stim-
uli, and again no signiicant results were found. For total 
amount of displacement, F (2, 58) = 1.29, MSE = 160.16, 
p > 0.05. For order, F (1, 29) = 0.00, MSE = 121.58 
p > 0.05. For the interaction, F (2, 58) = 0.96, MSE = 97.76, 
p > 0.05. Means ranged from 59.50 to 68.83. These results 
are consistent with the prediction.
Motion onset delay set
For purposes of comparison with the standard stimulus, 
data were initially analysed with a one-way ANOVA with 
13 levels, comprising the standard stimulus and the 12 
motion onset delay stimuli. This yielded a signiicant result, 
F (12, 348) = 20.39, MSE = 239.82, p < .001, η2p = 0.41. 
Post hoc paired comparisons with the Tukey’s test revealed 
that the standard stimulus received higher ratings than all 
other stimuli.
A planned 2 (irst object delay, 0 v. 54  ms) × 3 (total 
motion onset delay, 162 v. 324 v. 486  ms) × 2 (object 
motion onset order, 2/4/1/3 v. 3/1/4/2) ANOVA was car-
ried out. Means are shown in Table 2. For comparison with 
those means, the mean for the standard stimulus was 68.83.
There was a signiicant efect of total motion onset delay, 
F (2, 58) = 33.06, MSE = 336.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.53. Post 
hoc paired comparisons with the Tukey’s test revealed 
a signiicantly higher mean for 162  ms than for 324 and 
486  ms, which did not difer signiicantly. The efect of 
irst object delay fell short of statistical signiicance, F (1, 
29) = 3.62, MSE = 374.12, p > 0.05.
There was just one other signiicant result, an interaction 
between all three variables, F (2, 58) = 3.27, MSE = 132.00, 
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.10. As can be seen in Table 2, in two cases 
the mean for zero delay was higher than that for 54  ms 
delay. These were 162 ms total delay and for 324 ms delay, 
both with the 2/4/1/3 order. In the other four cases there 
was no signiicant diference. There is no readily apparent 
explanation for this interaction; it may be just that there is 
a weak efect of irst object delay that happens to reach sta-
tistical signiicance in some comparisons and not in others.
Speed variation set
For purposes of comparison with the standard stimu-
lus, data were initially analysed with a one-way ANOVA 
with 9 levels, comprising the standard stimulus and the 8 
speed variation stimuli. This yielded a signiicant result, F 
(8, 232) = 11.21, MSE = 322.61, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.28. The 
standard stimulus had a mean rating of 68.83 which was 
higher than that of any other stimuli in this set, and post 
hoc paired comparisons revealed that it was signiicantly 
higher in 4 out of 8 comparisons (p < 0.05).
A planned 2 (range of speeds, 8.1 v. 16.2  cm/s) × 2 
(slowest object speed used, 2.7 v. 8.1  cm/s) × 2 (object 
motion onset order, 2/4/1/3 v. 3/1/4/2) ANOVA was carried 
out. Means are shown in Table 3.
Just one efect was signiicant, a main efect of slow-
est object speed used, F (1, 29) = 29.68, MSE = 587.10, 
p < .001, η2p = 0.51, with a higher mean at 8.1 cm/s (57.23) 
than at 2.7 cm/s (40.19).
Discussion
The results for the vertical ofset and motion onset delay 
sets were in accordance with the predictions. There was 
no signiicant efect of manipulating the spatial aligment 
of the objects in stimuli in which they all shared the same 
kinematic properties (vertical ofset set). This indicates 
both that sharing kinematic properties is suicient for bind-
ing them into a single perceived object and that a strong 
Table 2  Mean causal impression ratings, Experiment 2, motion onset 
delay set
Total delay Object order First object delay
0 ms 54 ms
162 ms 2/4/1/3 50.40 40.20
3/1/4/2 44.47 46.17
324 ms 2/4/1/3 34.07 25.90
3/1/4/2 34.87 30.80
486 ms 2/4/1/3 28.77 29.13
3/1/4/2 26.10 23.20
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causal impression occurs with a launching-type stimulus 
involving such an object as the target. Staggering the time 
of motion onset across the four objects (motion onset delay 
set) resulted in substantially reduced causal impressions, 
consistent with the reasoning that the temporal manipu-
lation would disrupt common fate, and thereby preclude 
perception of a single object encompassing the four vis-
ible objects, with consequent weakening of the causal 
impression.
The standard stimulus received a higher mean rating 
than any of the stimuli in the speed variation set, but the 
diference was signiicant in only 4 out of 8 comparisons. 
This indicates that having the objects start to move at the 
same time but with diferent speeds is not as disruptive to 
the causal impression as the reasoning based on common 
fate would predict. A close look at the results suggests a 
possible explanation for this. There was an efect of only 
one of the manipulated variables, the slowest object speed 
used, with higher ratings at the faster speed (8.1 cm/s) than 
at the slower speed (2.7  cm/s). The noteworthy feature 
of this is that the stimuli concerned difer in other ways, 
but those diferences seem not to have afected the causal 
impression. For example, when the slowest object moved 
at 8.1 cm/s, the range of speeds was from 8.1 to 16.2 cm/s 
in the narrow range of speeds, but from 8.1 to 24.3  cm/s 
in the wide range of speeds, and yet this diference in the 
range of speeds had no signiicant efect. This indicates 
that the causal impression was afected only by the slow-
est moving object. In other words, ratings were moderately 
high (range 54.27–59.07) not because the launcher was per-
ceived as making all the four objects move but at diferent 
speeds, but because it was perceived as making only the 
slowest object move. This is the only way to account for the 
lack of efect of the range variable. It is perhaps relevant 
that the means, ranging from 54.27 to 59.07, were similar 
to the means for the one-object stimuli in Experiment 1 
(65.74 and 57.12). Thus, the manipulation has indeed dis-
rupted the causal impression associated with the perceived 
object constructed by common fate, but the resultant causal 
impression is not much reduced because the manipulation 
results in an impression that the launcher makes just one 
of the four target objects move. Why should that one be the 
slowest of the four? The launching impression is weak or 
absent when the target object moves faster than the causal 
object, and tends to be replaced by an impression called 
“triggering” (Michotte 1963), in which the target object’s 
motion as perceived as its own autonomous motion, but ini-
tiated by contact from the causal object (Hubbard 2013a; 
Michotte 1963; Natsoulas 1961). It is likely, therefore, that 
the launching impression occurred only for the slowest 
object of the four, and that triggering impressions occurred 
for the other objects, which were mainly perceived as mov-
ing of their own accord.
General discussion
In two experiments, launching and entraining stimuli were 
presented in which either the launcher or the target con-
sisted of four spatially separated objects that shared identi-
cal motion onset time and velocity, and the other object was 
a single object, as is customary with such stimuli. There 
was no visible contact between the single object and any 
of the four other objects. Strong causal impressions were 
reported, that were not signiicantly afected by whether 
a launching or an entraining stimulus was used, nor by 
whether the four objects were the target and the single 
object was the launcher or vice versa. The reported causal 
impression was signiicantly reduced, in Experiment 1, by 
manipulations known to reduce or eliminate common fate: 
the causal impression was weaker if there were two objects 
or one instead of four; the causal impression was weaker 
with greater spatial separation of the four objects; and 
when the four objects were the target, the causal impres-
sion was stronger if the four objects were initially in motion 
with identical motion properties than if they were station-
ary. In Experiment 2, the causal impression was not dis-
rupted by a change to the spatial alignment of the objects. 
The causal impression was, however, disrupted by changes 
to the kinematics such that diferent objects moved in dif-
ferent ways, starting to move at diferent times but with the 
same speed, or moving at diferent speeds. The change in 
kinematic properties meant that there was no common fate, 
but common fate was preserved with the change in spatial 
alignment alone. Overall, if the motions of the four objects 
had common fate, the causal impression was stronger than 
would normally be the case, given that there was a spatial 
gap between the launcher and the target (Michotte 1963; 
Yela 1952).
An important implication of this set of indings is that 
the perceptual interpretation of visual stimuli in phe-
nomenal causality research may include speciication 
of objects present in spaces where no object is visible. 
In the present case, the spaces between the four objects 
that share common motion properties are interpreted as 
Table 3  Mean causal impression ratings, Experiment 2, speed vari-
ation set
Range of speeds Object order Slowest object speed
2.7 cm/s 8.1 cm/s
8.1 cm/s 2/4/1/3 40.63 54.27
3/1/4/2 37.60 57.13
16.2 cm/s 2/4/1/3 40.63 58.47
3/1/4/2 41.90 59.07
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unseen parts of a single object, of which the four vis-
ible objects are also part. The visual system is presum-
ably adapted to a complex visual environment in which 
moving objects are sometimes partly occluded (e.g. by 
branches of trees or by railings), and is able to make a 
perceptual construct of a single object despite the par-
tial occlusions. The same reasoning applies to other 
instances of perceptual impressions of causality. For 
example, White and Milne (1997) presented a stimulus 
in which ive objects were arranged, initially stationary, 
in a columnar formation with gaps between them. First 
the topmost object began to move, then the second object 
started to move with the same motion properties, and so 
on until all ive objects were in motion. Observers con-
sistently reported a strong impression that the irst object 
was pulling the others. Strictly speaking, this is impos-
sible because there was no visible connection between 
the objects. However, by the likelihood principle, it is 
very unlikely that the ive objects would all share the 
same motion properties (except for time of motion onset) 
by chance. It is more likely that the irst object is indeed 
pulling the others, and that there is a physical connection 
between them that is not visible. The gap stimuli used by 
Michotte (1963) and Yela (1952) can be interpreted in 
the same way. A launcher cannot make a target move if 
there is an unbridged gap between them, and the temporal 
coincidence between the launcher stopping and the target 
starting to move is unlikely to occur by chance. However, 
the temporal properties of the stimulus are not so unlikely 
if there is a stationary object in the gap, contacting the 
target and contacted by the launcher, through which the 
momentum of the launcher is transferred to the target. 
Again, the object in the gap is not visible, but its presence 
forms part of the perceptual interpretation of the stimu-
lus. These examples show that the causal impression is 
integrated into a complex, coherent perceptual interpreta-
tion of the stimuli used in phenomenal causality research.
The reasoning about the efect of manipulations of com-
mon fate on the perceptual impression of causality was 
guided by the likelihood principle. It is certainly plausible 
in this case, on the grounds that the distal stimulus for a 
set of four objects whose motion exhibits common fate is 
more likely to be a single object under imperfect viewing 
conditions than four separate objects that happen to share 
motion properties. However, it is notoriously diicult to 
distinguish the likelihood principle from the simplicity 
principle, the principle that the percept constructed is the 
simplest interpretation of the stimulus information (Wage-
mans et  al. 2012). Other explanations for Gestalt percep-
tual phenomena have also been proposed though apparently 
not yet explicitly applied to common fate (Wagemans et al. 
2012). It remains possible that some explanatory principle 
other than likelihood would be the correct explanation for 
the results reported here; hopefully ways of distinguishing 
between the alternative principles can be devised.
In the stimuli where the target is the common fate object, 
the efect of common fate on the causal impression must be 
retrospective; that is, motion of the four objects after con-
tact inluences the percept of the contact event itself. This 
is not as odd as it might sound: the causal impression can-
not occur until some time after contact because information 
about the target’s motion after contact is required. Michotte 
(1963) reported that no causal impression occurs if the tar-
get does not move at or after contact, and the kind of causal 
impression that does occur depends, in part, on the relative 
speeds of the two objects (Michotte 1963; Natsoulas 1961). 
Choi and Scholl (2006) showed that perceptual interpreta-
tion of a stimulus as launching or as a kind of event not 
involving causality can be inluenced by another event that 
does not occur until about 200 ms after the target in the irst 
stimulus has started to move. So, insofar as it is an interpre-
tation of the contact event, the causal impression is inevita-
bly a postdictive phenomenon (Shimojo 2014).
As is always the case in experiments on phenomenal 
causality, there is a danger that participants’ responses 
could be inluenced by post-perceptual processing. Of par-
ticular relevance in this case is the issue of demand char-
acteristics, which are cues in the experimental situation 
that might convey the hypotheses and predictions to par-
ticipants, who are then motivated to produce the apparently 
desired behaviour (Orne 1962). The instructions stated 
that “people often do have a visual impression that one 
object made one or more others move even under condi-
tions where this could not happen in real life” (p. 12); this 
was intended to introduce participants to the possibility that 
causal impressions could occur even when moving objects 
do not come into contact. This might lead participants to 
report causal impressions they did not have. However, the 
issue is whether this reasoning could predict the speciic 
pattern of results obtained here. One might expect a general 
inlation of ratings, if this statement infuenced responses in 
the manner of demand characteristics. However, the state-
ment does not provide any basis for diferentiating between 
the stimuli. Mere exposure to a variety of stimuli does not 
provide any cues as to which ones should receive higher 
ratings. Participants could only generate the observed pat-
terns of responses in the absence of causal impressions if 
they were familiar with the research literature on common 
fate, such as the studies by Uttal et al. (2000) and Stürzel 
and Spillmann (2004) that were the basis of the predictions 
for Experiment 1, and if they could apply that knowledge to 
the conditions of the experiment. This seems unlikely, so 
it is unlikely that the tests of the predictions were compro-
mised by the wording of the instructions.
In conclusion, whether or not Michotte’s (1963) Gestalt 
interpretation of the launching and entraining efects is 
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correct, the occurrence and strength of both causal impres-
sions can be inluenced by common fate, such that the 
causal impression can occur when the launcher stops in 
empty space, if the space adjacent to its stopping location 
is perceptually interpreted as the unseen boundary of an 
object deined by the common fate of the motions of visible 
objects around it.
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